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et al.: Double Jeopardy

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6:
No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardyfor the
same offense ....
U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
No person shall be ... subjectfor the same offence to be twice
put injeopardy of life or limb ....
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Randall v. Rothwax 1 25
(decided September 6, 1990)

Invoking the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy, 126 Randall's attorney (petitioner) brought an article 78
proceeding on behalf of Randall to prohibit Randall's
reprosecution after the withdrawl of his guilty plea. 127
The court found that during Randall's criminal trial, the trial
court had coerced him to withdraw from his trial and enter a
guilty plea to a lesser charge.128 The court held that since
Randall had been coerced out of a trial in which he had an
otherwise "excellent" chance of acquittal, 129 his subsequent
125. 161 A.D.2d 70, 560 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1st Dep't 1990), aff'd, No. 209,
1991 N.Y. LEXIS 4797 (N.Y. Nov. 21, 1991).

126. Both the United States and the New York State Constitutions provide,
in substance, that a criminal defendant may not be placed twice in jeopardy for
the same offense. U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
127. Randall, 161 A.D.2d at 71, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
128. Id. at 76, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
129. Id. The court attached significant attention to the fact that the jury
would have, in all likelihood, acquitted Randall if he had not withdrawn from
the trial. Id. However, regardless of defendant's chances at his first trial, the
court's holding was premised on the fact that the trial court had coerced
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withdrawl of the guilty plea could not be viewed as consent to
reprosecution. 130 The court concluded that because Randall had
"irretrievably lost through no fault of his own" his "old chance
of acquittal," the government would be precluded from
13 1
reprosecuting him.
Randall was charged with attempted murder in the second degree and related crimes. 13 2 During jury deliberations the trial
judge informed Randall that "the jury was divided ten to two in
favor of conviction." 133 Consequently, though protesting his
innocence, Randall agreed to plead guilty to criminal use of a
firearm in the first degree, in exchange for a promised sentence
34
of 4 1/4 to 8 1/2 years.1
Shortly after the jury was discharged, it was learned that the
jury was, in fact, leaning ten to two in favor of acquittal. 135
Randall then moved to withdraw his plea, claiming that he had
been induced to enter a plea based upon "improperly conveyed
and inaccurate information.- ' 136 The trial judge granted the
motion. 137
Following the plea withdrawal, Randall then moved to preclude
a retrial on double jeopardy grounds. 138 The trial judge denied
the motion and Randall appealed. 13 9 On appeal, the court
determined that Randall's reprosecution would violate both
federal and state double jeopardy clauses. 140 The court began its
defendant into retreating from his first trial. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.

132. Id. at 71, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
133. Id. at 71, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 410.

134. Id. at 72, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. In granting defendant's motion to vacate the plea, the trial judge
stated, "it appears to me that the defendant and his Counsel may have been
misled, inadvertent to be sure, but misled by the Court nevertheless." Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 72-73, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 410-11.
140. Id. at 81, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 416. In support of its holding, the court
relied on state law to describe the historic importance and rationale behind
double jeopardy protection. Id. at 73, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 411 ("[the protection,

an ancient one deeply rooted in the common law has been thought an essential
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analysis by noting that a defendant may consent to reprosecution
in different situations. First, a defendant may consent to
14 1
reprosecution when he challenges a judgment of conviction.
Second, consent may also be inferred when a defendant either
moves for, or acquiesces in, the declaration of a mistrial. 142 In
both of these situations, a defendant is said to consent to
reprosecution in a quest for adjudication "in a forum free from
prejudicial taint."' 14 3 The court concluded that "[w]here . . . a
defendant has not sought to void or avoid a judgment, . . . no
consent to reprosecution can be inferred. " 144
The court noted that by entering a guilty plea, a defendant does
not seek to avoid a judgment of conviction.145 Additionally,
where a defendant has withdrawn his plea, in a case in which the
plea was coerced, there is also "no basis for characterizing the
46
motion to withdraw the plea as a consent to reprosecution."1
The court acknowledged that "there are circumstances in which
check upon the power of the state to intimidate its citizenry") (citations
omitted). Although the court chose to reach its ultimate holding by utilizing
federal law, the court expressly invoked the state constitution as an alternative
source of broader protection in the event that federal law could not support its
holding. Id. at 81, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 416 ("even if it were not possible to
distinguish Tateo [federal law], as we have, we would still determine to bar
reprosecution of the defendant, premising our ruling upon the independent
protections against double jeopardy found in our state constitution").
141. Id. at 74, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (unless the reversal "is predicated
upon evidentiary insufficiency").
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. ("[o]bviously, no consent to reprosecution can be inferred from an
action so unequivocally intended to bring the prosecution to a definite end").
146. Id. at 74, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 412. The court stated:
Where, however, the plea was coerced and the waiver of the defendant's
right to proceed before the first tribunal was therefore vitiated, we can
perceive no basis for characterizing the motion to withdraw the plea as a
consent to reprosecution. To conclude otherwise would be to say in
effect that a defendant may only vindicate one constitutional right -- the
right not to be convicted upon a coerced plea -- at the expense of
another constitutional right - the right not to be twice placed in
jeopardy.
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a defendant may be retried notwithstanding his lack of consent to
the premature termination of his first trial," but that such retrial
is "sharply limited to those cases in which the termination of the
first trial was dictated by manifest necessity." 14 7 The court then
stated that "[w]e can conceive of no case in which it would be
manifestly necessary for a Trial Judge to coerce a guilty plea
from a defendant. Far from being necessary, such conduct is
clearly contrary to the ends of public justice.', 148
The court next discussed the United States Supreme Court's
disposition of a factually similar case. 149 In United States v.
Tateo, the defendant withdrew from his ongoing criminal trial
and entered a guilty plea. 15 0 The trial judge told defendant that if
he insisted on continuing with his trial, and was convicted, the
court would surely sentence defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 15 1 Consequently, the defendant's plea
was set aside as coerced. 152 However, the Supreme Court held
that defendant's reprosecution would not be foreclosed by the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. 15 3
In so holding, the Supreme Court stated that "[a] defendant is
no less wronged by a jury finding of guilt after an unfair trial
than by a failure to get a jury verdict at all; the distinction between the two kinds of wrongs affords no sensible basis for differentiation with regard to retrial." 154
The first department, in Randall, clearly disagreed with the
Tateo holding. The court respectfully opined that the coercion of
a guilty plea by a trial judge is more serious than "'any defect
sufficient to constitute reversible error."' 155 The court reasoned
147. Id. at 77, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
148. Id.
149. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964) (five to four decision).
150. Id. at 464.

151. Id.
152. Id. at 464-65.
153. Id. at 464.

154. Id. at 467. The Supreme Court continued its rationale in a footnote and
stated that "[i]t is also difficult to understand why Tateo should be treated
differently from one who is coerced into pleading guilty before a jury is
impaneled." Id. at 467 n.2.
155. Randall, 161 A.D.2d at 77, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 413 (quoting Tateo, 377
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that other prejudicial trial errors "leave the defendant with the
option of continuing the trial in order to obtain a verdict of
acquittal .... 156 However, when a trial judge coerces a defendant to withdraw from his trial and enter a guilty plea, "the trial
judge completely abrogates that option, and so, defeats the valued
right of the defendant to obtain a verdict in one proceeding from
157
the first impanelled jury."
After expressing disagreement with the Tateo holding, the court
then challenged Tateo as being inconsistent with both prior and
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 158 Specifically, the court
noted that in United States v. Jorn, 15 9 Justice Harlan, who had
also authored Tateo, made the "unexceptionable acknowledgment
of the defendant's very substantial interest in retaining the option
to have his case decided by the first tribunal. . " 160 However,
the Supreme Court in Jorn distinguished its holding from the one
in Tateo, indicating that the defendant in Tateo retained the option of proceeding with his trial and could later "rely on
post-conviction proceedings to redress the wrong done to him by
the judge,"' 16 1 but that the defendant in Jorn lost such option by
the judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial. 162 The first
department, in Randall, argued that this distinction is untenable,
U.S. at 466).
156. Id. at 77, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 413-14.

157. Id. at 77-78, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
158. Id. The court found it difficult, inter alia, to "reconcile Tateo with
subsequent Supreme Court doctrine indicating that '[t]he important
consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the
defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of

[judicial or prosecutorial] error."' Id. at 78, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 414 (quoting
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976)).
159. 400 U.S. 470 (1971). InJorn, the District Court of Utah dismissed the
case on the ground of former jeopardy on an information charging the
defendant with willfully assisting in the preparation of fraudulent income tax
returns. Id. at 472. On appeal, the Court held that reprosecution of the
defendant would violate the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment.
Id. at 487.
160. Randall, 161 A.D.2d at 78, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 414.

161. Id. at 79, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 414 (quoting Jorn, 400 U.S. at 484, 485
n.ll).
162. Id. at 78, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 414 (citing Jorn, 400 U.S. at 484).
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urging that:
[t]he entry of a plea of guilty and loss of the right to proceed
before the first jury, are inextricably bound together. If the plea
has not been voluntary, we are completely at a loss to understand
how the defendant may be said to have still retained some meaningful option to go to the jury. 163
However, because Tateo has never been expressly overruled,
and because of its close factual similarity to the present case, the
first department attempted to distinguish it from Randall.
The court noted that "[a]lthough the Trial Judge's threat in
Tateo was highly coercive, it could not have affected [the defendant's] assessment of his chances for acquittal.", 16 4 On the other
hand, because the coercion in Randall was based on factual misrepresentation, Randall believed his chances for acquittal were
substantially diminished. 165
The first department also found no merit in the argument that
absent governmental intent to avoid an acquittal, Randall's double
jeopardy claim could not succeed. 166 The court noted that intent
only becomes relevant in cases where "the defendant has been
left with some option to go forward with his trial." 167 In the
court's view, Randall was completely deprived of his option to
obtain a jury verdict. 168
The court noted that reprosecution is constitutional if there is
no finding of an intent to avoid acquittal and where the defendant
retains an option to proceed with his trial: 169
Most typically, these are situations in which a mistrial has been
declared on the defendant's motion as a result of either judicial
163. Id. at 79, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 414-15.
164. Id. at 79, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 415 ("the defendant, arguably, might still
have chosen to submit his case to the jury had he had sufficient confidence in
its merits").

165. Id. ("the Judge's misrepresentation led the defendant to believe that he
could no longer trust the jury with his fate no matter how convinced he was of

his innocence and the merits of his defense").
166. Id. at 80, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 81, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16.
169. Id. at 80, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
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or prosecutorial error. It is recognized that in such circumstances, although the defendant is left with a most unhappy
choice, the choice of whether to proceed is still his; cognizant of
the error which has been made and its probable impact on his
chances with the jury, the defendant may intelligently elect either
to continue his trial or to seek to abort the tainted proceeding in
order to obtain a fresh chance for acquittal ....170
In these situations, the availability of the option to proceed has
been held enough to preclude most double jeopardy claims under
the Federal Constitution. 17 1 The first department recognized that
the rationale behind this is "that the social price of barring reprosecution in all cases where government error or even overreaching has provoked the defendant to move successfully for a
mistrial would be too high.' 172 However, the court noted that
"there must be some effective sanction for governmental overreaching" that results in reprosecution. 17 3 On the federal level,
the line has been drawn at actions intentionally trying to coerce
174
the defendant into requesting a mistrial.
Finding, in the present case, that the defendant's option to proceed had been, for all intents and purposes, "extinguished," the
court decided that the case was more like a mistrial declared sua
sponte by the judge, rather than by defendant's motion. 17 5 The
court, while able to distinguish this case from Tateo, made it
clear that had it not been distinguishable that it would have barred
6
reprosecution nonetheless: 17
We are left with the most serious doubts as to whether the availability of a constitutional right as fundamental as the right not to
be twice tried for the same offense, ought to depend upon the
sort of distinctions made relevant by Tateo ..

.

. [O]nce it had

been factually determined, as it was in Tateo, that a defendant
had been 'enveloped by a coercive force . ..which, under all

the circumstances, foreclosed a reasoned choice by him at the
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-09 (1976)).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1982)).
Id. at 81, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16.
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time he entered his plea,' there would be no possibility of sensibly concluding that the surrender of the right to go to the first
177
jury had been voluntary.

Citing the case at bar as "unique," 17 8 the court did not base its
conclusion on existing New York precedent. Rather, its analysis
was based on disagreement with what seems to be the leading
federal case on point, namely Tateo.
SUPREME COURT
KINGS COUNTY
1 79
People v. Smith

(decided December 11, 1990)

A criminal defendant brought a motion to bar his retrial and for
dismissal of his indictment on the grounds that a retrial would
violate his right to protection from double jeopardy under the
federal 1 80 and state1 81 constitutions. 182 The court held that the
declaration of a mistrial due to the inability of a juror to continue
with deliberations, upon learning that her nephew had been shot
and killed, was within the trial judge's proper discretion and

constituted a "manifest necessity" permitting retrial under double
jeopardy analysis. 183 The court additionally held that the
prosecutor had met his burden of establishing the manifest
necessity. 184
176. Id. at 81, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
177. Id. (quoting United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 568 (1963)).
178. Id. at 71, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
179. 149 Misc. 2d 346, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1990).
180. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
181. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
182. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 347, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
183. Id. at 349, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1015; see also Illinois v. Somerville, 410
U.S. 458 (1973); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); 3 W. LAFAVE &
J. ISRAEL, CRMIINAL PROCEDURE, § 24.1(c), at 63 (1984) [hereinafter
LAFAVE & ISRAEL].
184. Smith, 149 Misc. 2d at 349, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1015; see also LAFAVE
& ISRAEL, supra note 184, at 65 (stating that the burden falls on the prosecutor
when the mistrial has been declared over the objections of the defendant, and
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